Re-default Risk of Modified Mortgages

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Mortgage Risk Analysis Framework

Competing risk approach





Status Transition Approach





Incorporate Path Memory



Data

- FHA loans originated between 1996-2012
- Quarterly loan performance panel observations
 - Avoided sensor problem
 - Incorporate local market economic condition
 - Capture prior modification and cure history
- Two sets of multinomial logistic regression
 - C_D, C_CX, C_PRE, C_SR, C_C
 - D_CXS, D_CXM, D_PRE, D_CLM, D_D



Choice Based Sample

- 10% of good loans; 100% of bad loans
- 10% of quarters before ever-default; 100% of quarters after 1st default.

	Sample Observations	Total Original Observations	Sample Rate
C to C	20,024,231	158,984,465	13%
C to CX	186,815	186,815	100%
C to D	2,550,952	2,586,844	99%
C to PRE	584,758	3,756,763	16%
C to SR	201,556	1,741,915	12%
D to PRE	159,939	159,939	100%
D to CLM	658,541	694,433	95%
D to CX_M	324,789	324,789	100%
D to CX_S	747,035	747,035	100%
Total	25,438,616	169,182,998	15%

Modification as Loss Mitigation

- As an alternative way to enable refinance
 - Otherwise constrained by LTV or DTI to qualify for refinance loan
 - To avoid realizing default loss on book
 - Hope house price recovery will bailout default loss
- Policy objectives
 - Help borrowers keep their homes
 - Avoid massive default wave bring banking system down
 - Reduce number of REO sales on market, which could exacerbate housing market deterioration



Research Issues with Modification

- Which loans benefits from modification the most?
 - To minimize potential default loss = eventual PD x LGD
- What type of modifications to offer?
 - Forbearance, Rate Reduction, Term extension, Principal forgiveness
- What's the re-default risk of modified mortgages?
 - ► OCC reports 5-year re-default rate ≈ 70%
 - What are the main risk drivers after modification
- What's the LGD of modified mortgages?
 - Higher LGD due to more deterioration in physical condition and longer expenses



Current to Delinquent Transition (PD)

Variable	Name	Values	current_default	
Number of living units	liv_units_34	X=0/1		0.0789
	dpa_govt	X=0/1		0.1726
Downpayment assistant types	dpa_nonprof	X=0/1		0.3402
	dpa_relative	X=0/1		0.1097
Relative loan size	loansize	linear function		0.0007
1	ltv100	X=0/1		-0.0290
LIV	ltv95	X=0/1		0.0720
Spread at origination	sato1	Spling function	0	-0.0596
	sato2	spille function	>0	0.3891
	credit_score1	Spline function	600	-0.0025
Credit score	credit_score2		660	-0.0094
	credit_score3		>660	-0.0128
Missing credit score	credit_score_000	X=0/1		-0.1338
No credit score returned	credit_score_999	X=0/1		-0.6088
FHA credit score indicator	fha_score	X=0/1		-0.1757
Front-end Ratio	ratio_tmp_tei1	Spling function	28	0.0296
	ratio_tmp_tei2	spille function	>28	0.0095
Missing front-end ratio	dti000	X=0/1		-0.0691

Dynamic Variables

Variable	Name	Values	curre	nt_default
	ltv_current1		1	1.3791
	ltv_current2	Spling function	1.2	0.8968
	ltv_current3	spine function	1.4	1.4451
	ltv_current4		>1.4	0.0000
House price appreciation local level	hpa2y_n	linear function		-0.0128
Burnout factor. Prior	burnout1	~ !!	9	0.0007
cimulative number of quarters prepayment option in the	burnout2	Spline function	>9	-0.0015
Cumulative number of	c_burnout1	Spling function	6	0.0077
quarters under water	c_burnout2	Spille function	>6	-0.0252
Unemployment rate change in delta_ue1		Spling function	0	0.1183
last two quarters	delta_ue2		>0	0.1771
Difference of 10 year and 1 year CMT rates	ycslope	linear function		0.0280
	GSE_refi_ince_PMT1		0	0.0082
interest rate	GSE_refi_ince_PMT2	Spline function	25	0.0234
interest rate	GSE_refi_ince_PMT3		>25	-0.0317

Modification Variables

Variable	Name	Values	current_default	
Prior loan modification	prior_mod	X=0/1		0.1446
Demonstrate monthly never out	mod_pay_pct_rdct1		0.16	-5.7670
reduction of loan modification	mod_pay_pct_rdct2	y_pct_rdct2 Spline function	0.36	3.1272
	mod_pay_pct_rdct3		>0.36	1.8231
Missing payment reduction	mis_mod_pay_pct_rdct	X=0/1		-0.1508
Mortgage age function	age1		2	1.4014
	age2	Spline function	5	0.1524
	age3		>5	-0.0030
	cx_time1	Spling function	1	2.2639
Number of quarters since end of last default episode	cx_time2		10	-0.1108
	cx_time3	Spine function	25	-0.0286
	cx_time4		>25	-0.0041
	season_fall	X=0/1		0.3024
Season of year	season_spring	X=0/1		-0.0726
	season_summer	X=0/1	0.1606	
Intercept Term	contstant			-7.9545



Payment Reduction Dummy Variables





Implications

If house price growth = 0 for the next x years, the percent of re-default rate of modified loans would be

Quarterly	1-Year	2-Year	5-Year	10-Year
5%	18.5%	33.7%	64.2%	87.1%
10%	34.4%	57.0%	87.8%	98.5%
15%	47.8%	72.8%	96.1%	99.8%
20%	59.0%	83.2%	98.8%	100.0%
25%	68.4%	90.0%	99.7%	100.0%

Optimal size of payment reduction is about 15-20%. Further reduction leads to increase in re-default risk



Implications

- A modified loan with no payment reduction has redefault risk similar to a never defaulted loan with 200 points lower FICO score
- Modification of 18% payment reduction reduces redefault rate similar to the magnitude of 100 points higher FICO score
- Competing risk: re-default risk increases when refinance option is deep in the money
- Credit burnout: re-default risk decreases when continue payment through a period of underwater



Further Questions

- Why does higher payment reduction increase redefault risk?
 - Implication of income shock to the family; harder to recover drastic income reduction
 - Rate reduction to below market rate implies borrower cannot afford the house
- LGD of modified loan
 - Correlation between payment reduction and LGD?
 - Does increase in LGD in modified loan offset the reduction in eventual PD?
- Is modification a good loss mitigation policy? In a rising interest rate environment?

